Introduction
What is the rationale behind capital structure decisions in business firms? Theories targeting these decisions depart from more or less reasonable assumptions about market efficiency in terms of the objectives, expectations and information access of different stakeholders, like shareholders, creditors and managers. In this respect the theories alone provide only a partial understanding concerning the choice of a certain capital structure. On the one hand, we have the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , stating that value creation is independent of the financial mix. Their separation between value creation and financing constitutes the foundation for modern corporate finance, even though the assumption of perfect capital markets and zero transaction costs is an illusion. On the other hand, introducing a market imperfection in the form of corporate tax makes the funding of assets relevant to the market value of the firm. A clear preference will be given to debt financing to benefit from the tax shield arising from interest expenses. In principle firms should be financed by debt only. However, empirical evidence lends no support to such extreme debt reliance. The debt capacity of a firm is limited (c.f. Donaldson, 1961) . The reason is that high debt leverage will increase financial distress risks, which has a negative impact on the market value of the firm. Myers (1977) shows how reduced investment activity within the firm is related to financial distress. Management tends to underinvest in order to avoid a value transfer to debtholders. Hence, promising investment opportunities might be foregone. This duality of debt financing implies that an optimal capital structure exists, which lays the foundation for the static trade-off theory (Myers, 1984) .
The static trade-off theory rests on the assumption that there are no market imperfections except for corporate tax and financial distress costs. Stakeholders inside and outside the firm have access to identical market information. These conditions are relaxed in alternative theories explaining how and why firms choose between different kinds of capital. For example, the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) emphasizes the impact of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, whereas the signalling theory (Ross, 1977) and the market timing theory (Ritter, 1991) focus on transaction costs arising from asymmetric information. None of these theories, however, challenges the fundamental idea of static trade-off and an optimal capital structure. Introducing conflicting interests allows agency costs to be incorporated in an extended trade-off theory (cf. Myers, 1984) , and consideration of asymmetric information raises moral hazard problems. The search for funding of a firm's assets at the lowest possible cost is, in addition, made explicit in the market timing theory, claiming that low-cost equity capital can be found at certain points in time. Taking this into consideration, the trade-off theory has only one opposing challenger; the pecking order theory.
The pecking order theory originates from the early empirical work of Donaldson (1961) and is founded on observations of managerial financial decision-making in practice. Myers (1984) coined the term 'pecking order' when conceptualizing the theory into an asymmetric information setting where managerial incentives are perfectly aligned with the overall objective of maximizing shareholder value for the current owners. This theory does not acknowledge any optimal capital structure within firms. A firm's actual capital structure is seen as the aggregated result of successive financial decisions made by managers. In conditions of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders, the pecking order theory concludes that the implicit alliance between management and the current shareholders makes it costly for the firm to attract new investors; the lower the priority of a new security, the higher its cost. This creates a rank between different securities, where those with highest priority are ranked before securities with a lower priority. Following this logic, management's first choice is internally generated funds. Thereafter attention is directed to various forms of debt in a ranking order with respect to priority. In this pecking order new equity is regarded as a last resort. It should be noted that, because of asymmetric information, debt is preferred to equity even without corporate taxes.
